#MH370 - One year on...

It is now one year since Mh370 was lost on a routine flight. And despite all efforts, there is yet no sign of the wreckage, nor any indication of what went wrong on that night. Malaysia has released a report on the incident, and despite reading almost 600 pages, one comes no closer to understanding the event. There are pages and pages of technical information. Some that was already known, and some that is new, and even shocking. The only one thing that the report clearly highlights is the amount of confusion that prevailed on that fateful night. Analysing the communication logs, one sees a pattern of chaos; of lack of understanding aircraft overdue procedures; lack of comprehension of technology in use; and a clear lack of any organized response. It was over 5 hours before it was realized that the flight was missing and before any semblance of a search started. The fact that the aircraft had not responded to any nature of communication during this period and that it was not seen on any Air Traffic Radar system on its planned route was not considered a sufficient cause for alarm. However, this has no bearing on why the flight was lost and it is highly unlikely that even if the Airline and ATC units enroute had responded in time, the course of events could have been much different. Maybe we would have known where to look for the plane, but saving it from its fate would, in all probability, not have been possible.

The news on every TV Channel on first anniversary of the disappearance of MH 370 is that the battery for the locator beacon in the plane’s flight data recorder was life expired. This means that the battery should have been changed, but was not. The data recorder batteries are guaranteed to perform for 30 days, if they are replaced on schedule. However, on expiry of this stated life, 30 day transmission can no longer be guaranteed nor can it be guaranteed that the pinger will ping on the expected frequency and maintain the expected characteristics. This then has the implication that the data recorder may not have operated at all, or may have operated at reduced efficiency. However, even this does not in any way affect why the plane was lost in the first place and even if the battery had been replaced on schedule, it would not have changed the outcome on that fateful night. Also, it is extremely unlikely that the towed pinger locator went anywhere within listening range of the pingers in the first month. So, this information does not in any way help us to understand what happened on that fateful night #MH370 was lost.

What surprises me most about this report is lack of any clear statement, even now, on a very important question that I had raised with MAS last year and also highlighted in my book: Had MAS complied with the Boeing recommendation for replacement of conductive crew oxygen hoses with non conductive oxygen hoses and to sheath & clamp the electrical wires in proximity?

As many who have read my book "Into Oblivion" would be aware, Boeing 777 serial number 28420 which was operated as MH370, was one of the 280 aircraft produced by Boeing without proper sleeving and clamping of this wire, in violation and deviation to their design approval. It is significant to note that aircraft serial number 28423, which was being operated as EgyptAir 667 on 29 Jul 2011, suffered a cockpit fire. On investigation, the aircraft was found to differ from Boeing’s design. A clamp supporting the first officer’s wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of EgyptAir’s Boeing 777s were delivered with this deviation. The investigation concluded that the most likely cause was an Electrical fault or short circuit, which resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. If Boeing produced 280 aircraft without sleeving on this wire, then in all likelihood aircraft serial numbers 28420 (MH370) and 28423 (EgyptAir 667) would have been on the factory assembly-line at the same time and therefore, would likely have been wired the same way.

Boeing had determined that it was appropriate to install sleeving in these wires and had issued a service bulletin number 777-35A0027, dated December 15, 2011 and followed it with a Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. The bulletins contained a recommendation that in order to prevent electrical current from passing through the low-pressure oxygen hose internal anti-collapse spring, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the cockpit, replace the conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses, in addition to sheathing and proper clamping of all electrical wires in vicinity of oxygen hoses.

It is not known whether or not Malaysian Airlines had complied with this on the accident aircraft. My many emails on this subject have not been answered, or even acknowledged, by the airline. I did expect to find a clear statement of compliance in an official report, but there is not even a mention of this; and this makes me wonder, Why Not?

The pictures below show consequences of this fire on EgyptAir 667, which was on ground with Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting support available just seconds away. Imagine a similar situation on an aircraft in flight...

I can only hope the authorities wake-up and come clean with the truth at least now!

Into Oblivion (English)

North and South America, UK, Europe and Australia: https://www.createspace.com/4888847.
 
All of Asia (including India, Malaysia and China), Middle East and Africa: http://pothi.com/pothi/book/captain-samir-sam-kohli-oblivion.
 
If you prefer to read on Kindle, computer or tablet device, or order from Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00M0ENG2I 

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Stay Safe,

The Erring Human.