The distance between the two airports is 1,605
nautical miles (2,972 km), slightly exceeding the specified standard range of
the Avro RJ85, which is 1,600 nautical miles (2,963 km). During the last 15
minutes the flight had completed two laps of a racetrack holding pattern,
adding about 54 nautical miles (100 km) to its flight. The crash site was 10
nautical miles (19 km) from José María Córdova International Airport's runway
36.
Data with the website FlightRadar24 indicates
that this same aircraft had flown the same route at least twice before in the
month of November 2016. So, the first question that arises is how could they do
it if the distance between the airports exceeds maximum range of the aircraft?
The answer lies in winds and safety margins. Theoretical calculations for
maximum range are made for nil wind conditions and include a degree of safety
margin. The crew was taking advantage of en-route tail winds that gave them an
extra push and speed to cover a distance more than theoretical calculations for
max range permitted them to fly. They were also using-up all the safety margin
and counting on their ability to make a direct and straight-in approach &
landing to the airport. They had succeeded in achieving this at least twice
before. For sure, they would have landed with tanks almost empty, but having
succeeded in doing it twice would have certainly boosted their confidence level
in their own ability to pull it off again!
The standards for minimum fuel set by ICAO
require the minimum fuel available to be much more than what is required to
cover the straight line distance. Aircraft rarely fly on a straight line, because
they need to follow air routes. Further, they often need to deviate from this
route due to weather, turbulence or traffic. Additionally, fuel consumption
varies considerably with the speed, altitude and atmospheric temperature. ICAO
requires all these ‘foreseeable’ conditions to be accounted for in initial fuel
calculations. Then they need to add go-around fuel, diversion fuel, and
additional margins for not being able to land off the first approach at the
diversion airfield also. All this is the level of safety in commercial
aviation, and several airline companies require a further safety margin like 10
or 15% to be added to this ICAO standard, just to cater for any unforeseen
eventuality.
LaMia flight had deviated from all these
regulations. It is clear that the airline was habitually flying only with minimum
fuel for a direct straight line flight between the two airports, without any
kind of safety margin. Very simply, this aircraft was not designed to fly the
distance it was scheduled to fly! A refueling halt was a mandatory requirement
and could have been made at several en-route airports, including Bogota.
Medellin airport was handling a very unusual
traffic situation on the night of Monday the 28th of November 2016. The
video below has English subtitles and will help develop better understanding of
the events:
The airport had a complicated situation at
hand. VivaColombia Flight FC8170, an A320, had departed Bogota for San Andreas
island. However, shortly after departure, the crew realized that they had a
fuel leak. The aircraft declared an emergency and requested diversion to Medellin.
While the aircraft was approaching Medellin, the accident flight LMI2933 also
contacted Medellin and requested Priority Landing due to a fuel problem.
In aviation communications, a very clear
distinction is made between declaring an emergency and requesting for a
priority landing. Flight FC8170 had declared an emergency. It was also closer
to the airport and at a lower altitude in comparison to LMI2933, which had only
requested for a priority landing without declaring an emergency. Obviously, the
controller was correct in allocating priority to FC8170, the aircraft she knew
had an emergency as against LMI2933 which had only made a ‘priority landing’ request.
Now this was a fatal flaw in plans of LMI2933.
They had no fuel to fly around in circles waiting to land. They needed to
declare an emergency, but doing so would have exposed the flawed flight
planning and the fact that they had departed without the minimum regulation fuel
on-board! The crew gambled for too long and when they finally did declare the
emergency, in response to which the controller cancelled the already issued
clearance to Avianca flight AVA9771, and cleared flight LMI2933 to land, also
alerting the rescue services, it was unfortunately too late for them to reach
the runway! Their hesitancy in declaring an emergency cost 71 human lives!
So, is this pilot error? With due respect to
the deceased Pilot, who was also one of the owners of LaMia airline, I would
say, NO! This was not an error, but Gross Negligence, and not just on part of
the pilot. The airline is expected to have an organization structure. Flight
Despatchers, Operations assistants, Director of Operations, the MD or General
manager…all have a responsibility to ensure airlines operations are always in
compliance with the applicable regulations. There is no excuse for this kind of
‘error’, not once but at least thrice in a span of one month!
Bolivian Director General of Civil Aviation has
today, 01 Dec 2016, cancelled the AOC of LaMia airline. The airlines website
has gone off-line. Effectively, the airline has ceased to exist and several
senior managers are reported to be missing, in hiding.
These 71 lives were not lost to an accident, they
were murdered due to gross negligence of LaMia airline owners and operations
staff!
Stay safe,
The Erring Human.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Kindly refrain from posting obscenity or advertisements. Users posting inappropriate or unrelated comments will be blacklisted from further postings. Thank you for your understanding and for maintaining the professionalism of this blog.