Unsafe Supervision
In addition to those causal factors associated with
the pilot/operator, Reason (1990) traced the causal chain of events back up the
supervisory chain of command. Four categories of
unsafe supervision can thus be identified: inadequate supervision; planned inappropriate operations;
failure to correct a known problem; and supervisory violations. Each
is described briefly below.
Selected
Examples of Unsafe Supervision (Note: This is not a complete listing)
Unsafe
Supervision
|
|||
Inadequate
Supervision
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Planned
Inappropriate Operations
|
Failed
to correct a known problem
|
Supervisory
Violations
|
Failed
to provide guidance
|
Failed
to provide correct data
|
Failed
to correct a document in error
|
Authorised
unnecessary hazard
|
Failed
to provide operational doctrine
|
Failed
to provide adequate brief time
|
Failed
to identify an at-risk aviator
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Failed
to enforce rules and regulations
|
Failed
to provide oversight
|
Improper
manning
|
Failed
to initiate corrective action
|
Authorised
unqualified crew for flight
|
Failed
to provide training
|
Mission
not in accordance with rules/regulations
|
Failed
to report unsafe tendencies
|
|
Failed
to track qualifications
|
Provided
inadequate opportunity for crew rest
|
||
Failed
to track performance
|
Inadequate Supervision. The role of any
supervisor is to provide the opportunity to succeed. To do this, the
supervisor, no matter at what level of operation, must provide guidance,
training opportunities, leadership, and motivation, as well as the proper role model
to be emulated. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, it is
not difficult to conceive of a situation where adequate crew resource management
training was either not provided, or the opportunity to attend such training
was not afforded to a particular aircrew member. Conceivably, aircrew coordination
skills would be compromised and if the aircraft were put into an adverse
situation (an emergency for instance), the risk of an error being committed
would be exacerbated and the potential for an accident would increase markedly.
In a similar vein, sound professional guidance and oversight is an
essential ingredient of any successful organization. While empowering
individuals to make decisions and function independently is certainly essential,
this does not divorce the supervisor from accountability. The lack of guidance
and oversight has proven to be the breeding ground for many of the violations
that have crept into the cockpit. As such, any thorough investigation of
accident causal factors must consider the role supervision plays (i.e., whether
the supervision was inappropriate or did not occur at all) in the genesis of
human error.
Planned Inappropriate Operations. Occasionally, the
operational tempo and/or the scheduling of aircrew is such that individuals are
put at unacceptable risk, crew rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance
is adversely affected. Such operations, though arguably unavoidable during
emergencies, are unacceptable during normal operations. Therefore, the second
category of unsafe supervision, planned inappropriate operations, was created
to account for these failures.
Take, for example, the issue of improper crew pairing. It is well
known that when very senior, dictatorial captains are paired with very junior,
weak co-pilots, communication and coordination problems are likely to occur.
Commonly referred to as the trans-cockpit authority gradient, such conditions likely
contributed to the tragic crash of a commercial airliner into the Potomac River
outside of Washington, DC, in January of 1982 (NTSB, 1982). In that accident,
the captain of the aircraft repeatedly rebuffed the first officer when the latter
indicated that the engine instruments did not appear normal. Undaunted, the
captain continued a fatal take off in icing conditions with less than adequate take-off
thrust. The aircraft stalled and plummeted into the icy river, killing the crew
and many of the passengers.
Clearly, the captain and crew were held accountable. They died in
the accident and cannot shed light
on causation; but, what was the role of the supervisory chain?
Perhaps crew pairing was equally responsible. Although not specifically addressed
in the report, such issues are clearly worth exploring in many accidents. In
fact, in that particular accident, several other training and manning issues
were identified.
Failure to Correct a Known Problem. The third category
of known unsafe supervision, Failed to Correct a Known Problem, refers to those
instances when deficiencies among individuals, equipment, training or other
related safety areas are “known” to the supervisor, yet are allowed to continue
unabated. For example, it is not uncommon for accident investigators
to interview the pilot’s friends, colleagues, and supervisors after a fatal
crash only to find out that they “knew it would happen to him some day.” If the
supervisor knew that a pilot was incapable of flying safely, and allowed the
flight anyway, he clearly did the pilot no favours. The failure to correct the behaviour,
either through remedial training or, if necessary, removal from flight status,
essentially signed the pilot’s death warrant - not to mention that of others
who may have been on board.
Likewise, the failure to consistently correct or discipline
inappropriate behaviour certainly fosters an unsafe atmosphere and promotes the
violation of rules. Aviation history is rich with reports of aviators who
tell hair-raising stories of their exploits and barnstorming low-level flights
(the infamous “been there, done that”). While entertaining to some, they often
serve to promulgate a perception of tolerance and “one-up-man ship” until one
day someone ties the low altitude flight record of ground-level! Indeed, the
failure to report these unsafe tendencies and initiate corrective actions is
yet another example of the failure to correct known problems.
Supervisory Violations. Supervisory
violations, on the other hand, are reserved for those instances when existing
rules and regulations are wilfully disregarded by supervisors. Although
arguably rare, supervisors have been known occasionally to violate the rules and
doctrine when managing their assets. For instance, there have been occasions
when individuals were permitted to operate an aircraft without current qualifications
or license. Likewise, it can be argued that failing to enforce existing rules
and regulations or flaunting authority are also violations at the supervisory
level. While rare and possibly difficult to cull out, such practices are a
flagrant violation of rules and invariably set the stage for the tragic
sequence of events that predictably follow.
So much for the role of supervision in controlling human error. Can you now co-relate how poor supervision caused the Doom of Arthur Andersen? There are many case studies that highlight the role of supervision in preventing human error and we will do some later in this journey. For the present, if there are no questions, we will move on to the Lion of accident causation food chain - The Organisation.
Until next week,
The Erring Human.
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